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4.1  Introduction 
Economists have long debated the merits of  changes in the tax treat- 
ment of housing, and reform of housing policy has been a perennial topic 
of  discussion both within and outside government in the United King- 
dom. Given the size of  government subsidies and the importance of 
housing  in  both the budgets  and  balance  sheets of  households, this 
interest  is  not  surprising.  Public subsidies (regardless of  the precise 
definition of  an economic subsidy) run to many billions' of  dollars per 
annum, and investment in housing now accounts for 50% of the net worth 
of  the United Kingdom personal sector. 
Among the frequent suggestions for reform are the reintroduction of a 
tax on the imputed income of  owner-occupiers (such a tax existed in the 
United Kingdom until 1963 and was known as Schedule A) and, as an 
alternative, the abolition of tax relief on mortgage interest. In the public 
sector  the  Conservative  government  elected  in  1979  has  proposed 
changes in the level of subsidies which would have a direct impact on the 
level of rents charged to local authority tenants. In assessing the effects of 
such policies it is clearly important to assess the distribution of gains and 
losses from any potential reform. Decision makers are naturally reluctant 
to commit themselves to change without detailed knowledge about who 
gains and who loses. 
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The usual approach to such questions is to estimate the overall effi- 
ciency gain by an approximation formula (for example, the “triangle” 
measure of  Harberger 1974) and to examine the distributional conse- 
quences only in rather aggregative terms or for hypothetical households 
(the well-known married couple with two children on average earnings). 
When individual household data are available, this is an inefficient and 
inaccurate method of  calculating both the efficiency effects of a reform 
and the distributional consequences of a change. Even if it were possible 
to argue persuasively that a particular reform would lead to an increase in 
efficiency in the economy as a whole, policymakers should, and almost 
certainly would, demand from the economist information on the distribu- 
tion  of  gains and losses from the reform.  In this paper we present  a 
method for computing the gains and losses from changes in  housing 
policy by simulating the effects of  different reforms using a data set for 
5,895 individual households in England and Wales constructed from the 
Family Expenditure Survey. The aim of  the paper is primarily methodo- 
logical, and is to illustrate the calculation of  gains and losses with refer- 
ence to one particular reform, namely the reintroduction of  a tax on 
imputed income from owner occupation. It should not be assumed that 
such a change is the most probable direction for reform in Britain (more 
likely, perhaps, is a continuation of  the present trend toward phasing out 
mortgage interest deductibility), but it has been widely discussed and 
presents a good example for the methodology outlined here. 
Calculations of  gains and losses are  carried out under two assumptions. 
First, we assume that behavior is unchanged, which is the kind of calcula- 
tion performed  by  government  departments. This figure is useful  for 
purposes of  comparison and corresponds to the “first-round” effect of the 
change.  The second case is where we  allow explicitly for behavioral 
responses using econometric estimates of the demand for housing derived 
from the same data set as  we use for simulation. Incorporating behavioral 
responses enables us to compute exact measures of  the welfare gain or 
loss for each household in the sample, and to examine not only the overall 
efficiency gains but also the distributive effects of a reform. We show that 
it is important not to view the distributive effects simply in terms of an 
average gain or loss for each decile, say, of  the original distribution, but 
to examine the variation within  each decile.  We also examine some 
summary statistics which show the value a decision maker will attach to a 
reform corresponding to different sets of  attitudes on his part toward 
vertical and horizontal equity. This enables us to evaluate a proposed 
reform in terms of the trade-offs between its effect on the average level of 
welfare (the efficiency gain), the distribution of  welfare levels, and the 
ranking of  households within the distribution. A diagram is used to show 
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Section 4.2 of  the paper discusses the measurement of  welfare gains 
and losses, section 4.3 discusses the government’s revenue constraint , 
section 4.4 analyzes the valuation of a reform in terms of a social welfare 
function, section 4.5 describes some of the relevant features of the United 
Kingdom housing market and the measurement of  housing costs, and 
section 4.6 presents the results of simulating a reform of the tax treatment 
of  owner-occupied  housing  which  removes  the  subsidies  to  owner 
occupation and distributes the proceeds  as an equal lump sum to all 
households. 
4.2  The Measurement of Gains and Losses 
We wish to exploit econometric estimates of the demand for housing in 
our measurement of gains and losses from reform. To do this we assume 
that a household’s preferences are defined over two commodities, hous- 
ing services (El) and a composite commodity of other goods and services 
(C).  These preferences may  be  represented  by  either a direct or an 
indirect utility function. For household h the two functions are given by 
(1)  uh =  u(XHh,XCh)  > 
(2)  vh  = v(Yh#Hh,PCh)  9 
where 
XHh = the quantity of  housing services consumed, 
xch = the quantity of  the composite commodity consumed, 
PHh = the tax-inclusive price of  housing services, 
PCh = the tax-inclusive price of the composite commodity. 
yh = posttax household income (assumed to be exogenous), 
Note that in general prices are household-specific. It is important to allow 
for price  variation  within the sample when  analyzing housing policy 
because the price of housing services varies from household to household 
depending upon factors such as marginal tax rates and income-related 
subsidies. The form of the utility function we shall use in the simulations 
will be discussed below. First, we define what we mean by  a reform. 
In the supposed initial, or original, position, household h has exoge- 
nous income yj and faces prices &h  and p&.  After  the reform the 
household faces a new vector of postreform income yR and priceshh  and 
p&.  A reform is defined as the mapping from the original to the postre- 
form vector 
(3) 
Several issues arise in the definition of a reform. First, the postreform 
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considering their effect on the government's budget constraint. We shall 
consider revenue-neutral  reforms, and the implications of  this for the 
definition of  the postreform variables are discussed below in section 4.4. 
Second, a reform which alters the prices facing consumers will change the 
aggregate demand for housing services, and in turn this may lead to a 
partially  offsetting change in  producer  prices.  The magnitude of  this 
effect will depend upon the elasticity of  supply of  housing services. In the 
first simulations we shall ignore supply effects and assume that producer 
prices  are fixed  (i.e. an  infinite  supply elasticity).  But we  shall  also 
examine an alternative assumption about the elasticity of  supply. Finally, 
the effect of  the change in the price of  housing services on tenure choice 
will be ignored. In principle this can easily be allowed for in the analysis 
by letting the relevant price facing a household be that of  the preferred 
tenure, owner occupation or rental (see Rosen and Small 1981), but in 
the United Kingdom  rationing  is  the major determinant of  housing 
tenure because of constraints in the capital market and the lack of a free 
market in  rental  housing  (King  1980). Hence we have assumed  that 
tenure choice is given. Future work will investigate the interaction be- 
tween rationing and price, and their effects on tenure choice. 
The reform we shall simulate is the removal  of  tax  concessions to 
owner-occupied  housing, with  the additional revenue  thus generated 
being distributed as a lump-sum subsidy. We shall assume that this is 
achieved by the introduction of  a new tax on the imputed income from 
owner occupation (for further discussion of  this see Atkinson and King 
1980; Hughes 1980). The price index of other consumption will remain 
unchanged. 
For each household in the sample we shall define two measures of  the 
gain or loss resulting from the reform. The first is the impact or "first- 
round" effect of the reform, which is the effect on the household's cash 
flow assuming that the household does not change its behavior. We shall 
call this the cash gain (CG). It is the sort of  statistic which government 
departments compute, and, although open to obvious objections, it is a 
natural first step in the analysis of  any reform. It is independent of  any 
assumptions about the form of  the utility function (i.e. about household 
preferences).  Cash gain is defined by 
(4)  CG=jjP- Y  -  (z&  -PE>X,"  7 
where X:  is the original quantity of housing services consumed and  is an 
estimate of  the postreform  income consistent  with  a revenue-neutral 
reform given unchanged behavior. The true  yf' will differ fromy  because 
of  changes in household behavior. For a revenue-neutral reform 
(5)  3 (% -  YZ1) = 3 (&h  -  PEh>&  . 
It is clear from (4) and (5)  that by definition the mean value of cash gain 113  Distribution of Gains and Losses from Housing Tax Treatment 
is zero. Because it ignores behavioral responses, the cash gain measure 
provides no information about the efficiency aspects of the reform, but it 
does indicate the immediate distributional consequences of  the reform 
before households have had time to adjust their behavior. 
In the long run, behavioral responses to the changes in prices and 
incomes will invalidate the use of cash gain as a measure of the change in a 
household’s welfare. Our second measure of the cash value of the reform 
to a household allows for behavioral responses. This is defined as the sum 
of  money the household would have accepted in the initial position as 
equivalent to the impact of  the reform. We call this the equivalent gain 
(EG). In other words, carrying out the reform is equivalent to giving each 
household a sum of money equal to the value of  its equivalent gain. It is 
defined in terms of  the indirect utility function by 
These two measures of the gain to a household provide exact measures 
of the welfare gain from a reform and its distribution among households. 
Cash gain measures the impact effect of  a reform; equivalent gain mea- 
sures its long-term effect. 
In addition to the distributional effect of  the reform, we shall wish to 
compute the efficiency gains, and this raises the question of the relation 
between our measure of  the equivalent gain and conventional measures 
of the excess burden or deadweight loss from distortionary taxes. Exact 
measures of  excess burden based on explicit utility functions are dis- 
cussed by  Mohring  (1971), Diamond  and  McFadden  (1974), Rosen 
(1978), Hausman (1981), Auerbach and Rosen (1980), and Kay (1980). 
The concept of equivalent gain offers a particularly simple and appealing 
way of  computing an exact measure of  deadweight loss because,  for 
revenue-neutral reforms, the efficiency gain to the economy as a whole is 
simply equal to the sum of  equivalent gains over households. 
The reason for this is clear. A reform which is self-financing  satisfies  the 
overall production constraint of the economy (provided that the effect of 
the reform on prices and exogenous incomes has been correctly speci- 
fied). Hence a revenue-neutral reform which produces a positive average 
equivalent gain is equivalent to a Pareto improvement combined with a 
set of lump-sum redistributions among households. In other words, if  the 
mean  value  of  equivalent  gain is positive,  then  there exists a set of 
lump-sum transfers in the original position such that the reform makes 
each household better off by an amount equal to the mean value of EG. 
The sum of  the equivalent gains is therefore an exact measure of  the 
efficiency gain (or reduction in deadweight loss) from the reform. 
In order to compute a value for the equivalent gain of each household 
we must specify both a functional form and parameter values for the 
indirect  utility  function.  In  this  study we  shall use  estimates of  the 114  Mervyn A. King 
homothetic translog indirect utility function used to generate equations 
for the demand for housing services reported by  King (1980). The in- 
direct utility function takes the form 
(7) 
Using the Roy-Ville identity we obtain the demand function 
Since the price of  housing services varies across households, the de- 
mand equation given by (8) may be estimated using cross-section data. 
The following parameter estimates were obtained using household data 
in England and Wales from the Family Expenditure Survey for the tax 
year 1973/74 (King 1980; standard errors in parentheses): 
p1=  0.1022  , 
(0.0008) 
p2=  0.0238  . 
(0.0009) 
Although this specification assumes unitary income elasticities of  de- 
mand, such an assumption may not be unreasonable given the results of 
Clark and Jones (1971) for the United Kingdom and Rosen (1979) for the 
United States, and also of  other studies when viewed in the light of  the 
biases discussed by Polinsky (1977) (for an elaboration of this point see 
King 1980). 
From  (6)  and  (7),  and  noting  that  in  the  reform  simulated 
pz  =  ppC  =  pc, we may solve for the equivalent gain to give 
EG=y”(k]  0  (P1 + PZQ  2)  }-Yo  7 
(9) 
where 
z=-  P!I& 
P:  . 
For those households whose housing costs do not alter (namely rent- 
ers) the value of their equivalent gain is equal to the lump-sum transfers 
they receive. For homeowners, however, the equivalent gain depends on 
the  change  in  the  price  of  housing  services  and  the  preference 
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4.3  Self-Financing Reforms 
A reform is defined by specifying for each household a set of  postre- 
form prices and an income level. These values cannot be chosen indepen- 
dently but must satisfy an overall revenue constraint to ensure feasibility. 
A self-financing reform must yield the same level of  total revenue as in 
the initial position, and we shall assume that revenue raised by reducing 
housing subsidies is returned to households in the form of  a flat-rate 
lump-sum subsidy denoted by  1. In practice this could be achieved by  a 
combination of a rise in the tax threshold and an increase in cash benefits 
(principally unemployment  benefit and basic retirement pensions)  to 
those below the tax threshold. This is a good approximation to a lump- 
sum subsidy because  the marginal rate  of  income tax in  the United 
Kingdom is a constant for a very large fraction of the population (Kay and 
King 1980). 
Preferences are assumed to be defined over housing services and a 
composite commodity of other goods and services. If  the tax rate on the 
composite commodity is held constant, then 
(10)  Nl= 4 (tfihpfihxfih -  &h&h&h  +  tCPC(x"ch -  $h))  9 
where tH and tc are the tax-inclusive commodity tax rates on housing 
services and on other consumption, respectively, and where the former is 
household-specific. 
From households'  budget constraints we have that 
(11)  PC(x"c-d?h)  =l4&hXih  -Pfihxfih  . 
Combining these two equations we have 
If the composite commodity tax rate varies across households, then in 
the above equation  t,  is  replaced  by  the unweighted  average of  the 
household-specific composite commodity tax rates. The only unobserv- 
able variable in this expression is the demand for housing in the postre- 
form equilibrium. Given the demand function in (8),  it is possible to solve 
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4.4  The Social Value of a Reform 
In addition to information about the distribution of CG and EG among 
households, we shall also compute several measures of the “social value” 
of  a reform. By this we mean any measure which requires some assump- 
tion about the cardinality of  individual utility functions, so that we may 
construct a social welfare function. To derive CG and EG requires only 
an ordinal measure of utility. 
The first set of  calculations is for various indices of  inequality of  both 
the original and the postreform distributions. It is conventional to exam- 
ine the distribution of “income,” but this presupposes an unidimensional 
measure of a household’s welfare. Since prices differ between households 
and also between  the original and postreform  positions,  the level of 
income is an inadequate measure of a household’s welfare. The problem 
arises, of course, only when preferences are defined over more than one 
commodity. The obvious unidimensional measure is the value of  the 
indirect utility function. But this requires a suitable normalization and 
does not avoid the problem of choosing a reference price vector at which 
welfare comparisons can be made. The normalization we shall choose is 
to define the concept of  “equivalent income” (King 1983b). A house- 
hold’s equivalent income yE is defined as that level of  income which, at 
the reference price vector, gives the same level of utility as that which the 
household enjoys at the actual level of  income and prices it faces. For- 
mally, 
(14)  V(YEh,PHR,PCR) = V(Yh,PHh,PCh)  7 
where pR  is the reference price vector. 
From (7) we have that 
With this expression for equivalent income we may compute values for 
both original and postreform equivalent income for each household in the 
sample. The choice of the reference price level is arbitrary, but the most 
sensible choice is to use the average level of prices in the original position. 
It is much easier to ask policymakers to provide relative valuations of 
increments to equivalent income at different levels of  equivalent income 
(a measure of  inequality aversion on the part of the policymaker) for the 
current (original) price level than for some other hypothetical price level. 
It is clear from (14) that with this choice of  reference price level, if  there 
were no differences between the prices faced by different households, 
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original income and the postreform level of  equivalent income would 
equal original income plus the value of  the household’s equivalent gain 
(King 1983). 
A measure of inequality may now be defined over the distribution of 
household equivalent incomes, both before and after the reform. The 
inequality measure on which we shall concentrate is the Atkinson (1970) 
index, which imposes the condition that the inequality index should be 
independent of  the mean of the distribution. This in turn implies a social 
welfare function which exhibits constant relative-inequality aversion. We 
compute this  index  for the two pairs of  distributions  which  are the 
analogues to the two measures of household gain defined above. The first 
is a rather simpleminded comparison between the distribution of original 
income yo and the distribution of  yo + CG. This measure requires no 
assumption about individual preferences orderings and ignores behav- 
ioral  responses.  The second comparison is between y:  and YE. This 
describes the distribution of  (suitably normalized) utility levels in the 
original and postreform positions. 
For each of  these comparisons we also compute the index of “horizon- 
tal inequity” proposed by King (1983a), which is a function of  a variable 
dh,  where dh is the absolute value of  the difference between the equiva- 
lent income of  household h in the postreform distribution and the level of 
equivalent income in the postreform distribution which corresponds to 
the rank of household h in the original distribution (normalized by mean 
postreform income). The Atkinson index of  vertical inequality (I,) and 
the index of  horizontal inequity (IH)  are related to the index of overall 
inequality (I)  by the simple relation 
(16)  1 -  z = (1 -  Z,)(1  -  Z,)  , 
for the distribution {YEh},  where E and q  are, respectively, the vertical and 
horizontal inequality aversion parameters. Both inequality aversion pa- 
rameters vary  from zero to infinity.  When  they  are zero, the social 
welfare function is concerned solely with the efficiency gains from the 
reform. When E  and q  are positive, the social welfare function takes into 
account not only efficiency gains but also changes in the shape both of the 
distribution and of  the ranking within the distribution. The calibration of 
the parameters may be explained as follows. If the same social value is 
attached to  a marginal dollar in the hands of a household with equivalent 
income y as to  x dollars for a household with equivalent income py, then 
x = pE. For example, when E = 0.5, one dollar taken from a household 118  Mervyn A. King 
with twice average income has the same social value as 50 cents given to a 
household with one-half  the average income. The social value of  the 
equivalent income of  a household which has changed positions in the 
distribution is equal to the social value of an income ye- Td. When q = 0.5 
a change in ranking equivalent to 10% of  mean income (dh  = 0.1) is 
regarded as equivalent to a reduction in income of about 5%, and when 
r) = 5 the corresponding reduction is approximately 40%. 
Finally, we compute an exact measure of  the social value of  a reform 
which parallels our measure of the value of the reform to an individual 
household and which may be termed the “social equivalent gain.” We 
assume a social welfare function of  the form which underlies the inequal- 
ity indexes given by (17). The social equivalent gain is the sum of  money 
which, if  distributed in such a way as to produce an equal increment in 
original equivalent income, would produce a level of social welfare equal 
to that derived from the postreform equilibrium. The social equivalent 
gain is denoted by SG and is defined by 
(18) 
This equation gives the social gain as a function of  the two inequality 
aversion parameters. When they are both zero, only the efficiency aspects 
of the reform are taken into consideration. In general, however, positive 
values of E and r) mean that the distributional benefits of  the reform are 
valued as well as the efficiency gains, and the total effect is expressed in 
terms of  a money measure. 
The social equivalent gain implicitly trades off  efficiency versus distri- 
butional benefits, and this may be shown explicitly in terms of a diagram. 
If we set SG = 0, then (18) is a functional relation between E and r) which 
gives pairs of values of the two inequality aversion parameters for which 
the policymaker is indifferent between the original and postreform posi- 
tions. This locus may be plotted on a diagram with E on the vertical axis 
and r) on the horizontal axis. If  the reform results in an efficiency gain 
then the curve will  cut  the horizontal  axis in  the positive  quadrant, 
whereas if  there is an efficiency loss it will cut the vertical axis. Any point 
in the positive quadrant represents a particular social welfare function, 
and thus the diagram shows for which social welfare functions the reform 
will be approved and for which the status quo will be preferred to the 
reform. 
% (y&, + SG)’ -‘  = 3  (y&  exp( -  r)dh))’ -‘  . 
4.5  Housing Costs and the United Kingdom Housing Market 
4.5.1  Basic Assumptions 
The most significant feature of  the United Kingdom housing market is 
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This arises mainly within the rental sector (both public and private) in 
which the coefficient of  variation of  the price of housing services exceeds 
0.4  (King 1980). The  variance of housing costs within the owner-occupied 
sector is much less because the source of variation here derives mainly 
from differences in marginal tax rates. As mentioned earlier, the United 
Kingdom system closely approximates a linear tax schedule. 
Nevertheless, there is substantial variation in housing costs between 
the different tenures. Owner occupation has grown  rapidly  and now 
accounts for about 60% of all dwellings. As in the United States, no tax is 
levied on the imputed rental income from owner occupation and interest 
on mortgages is tax deductible. In addition, no capital gains tax is charged 
on principal  residences.  These provisions provide  a subsidy to owner 
occupation relative to the level of  rents in the uncontrolled rental sector. 
About 30% of  dwellings are rented public (local authority) housing, and 
only 10% are privately  rented. Of  the latter, in the sample period of 
1973/74  most had controlled rents but some (furnished rental units) were 
uncontrolled. The combination of government subsidies and rent control 
led to rents in the subsidized rental sector well below the level of  rents in 
the uncontrolled furnished rental sector. 
The data set we shall use consists of the 5,895 households in England 
and Wales with positive housing costs which participated in the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES) during the tax year  1973/74. (We have ex- 
cluded households living in rent-free accommodation provided by  em- 
ployers.) The FES is a continuous stratified sample survey of  household 
incomes and expenditures. Of the 5,895 households, 3,143 were in owner 
occupation, 1,752 in local authority housing, 765 in controlled private 
rental dwellings, and 235 in uncontrolled rental accommodation. Since 
1973 the share of  owner occupation has risen from 53% to almost 60%, 
with a corresponding decline in the private rental sector. 
Household income is defined as “normal” gross household income plus 
income  in  kind  (including  imputed  income  from  owner  occupation) 
minus tax and national insurance contributions.  Capital gains are ex- 
cluded because they are not recorded in the FES. Estimates of  “normal” 
income are provided by individuals in response to interview questions 
designed to  elicit information about such factors as  overtime earnings and 
short-time working. Consumption of  housing services is measured by a 
dwelling’s “gross  rateable value.”  In the United  Kingdom  an official 
assessor assigns to each dwelling an estimate of its rental value known as 
the gross rateable value. Revaluations for all dwellings in England and 
Wales were made immediately prior to  the  survey period. The price index 
of  housing costs for tenants is defined as expenditure (the sum of  rent and 
rates [property  taxes] minus any rebates) divided by gross rateable value. 
For owner-occupiers the price index of  housing services is the “effective 
rental” plus rates (net of  rebates) divided by gross rateable value. The 120  Mervyn A. King 
“effective rental” of owner-occupied housing is the product of its rental 
value (which we measure by gross rateable value) and a factor denoted by 
F, which allows for the tax subsidy to owner occupation. The value of  c~ 
may under certain assumptions be written as (Rosen 1979; King 1980) 
(19)  p=l-UT, 
where T  is the homeowner’s marginal tax rate and (1 -  a)  is the fraction of 
rental value accounted for by depreciation and maintenance. The value 
of a may be represented by the ratio of net to gross rateable value, both of 
which are recorded in the FES. This measure of housing costs does allow 
for inflation, and the reader is referred to King (1980).  The price of the 
composite commodity varied among households because they were sam- 
pled at different dates during the year. The retail price index for con- 
sumption other than housing services was computed for each month and 
the appropriate index used for each household. 
The reform we shall simulate is the introduction of  a tax on imputed 
rental income. This is equivalent to setting the value of  I.L equal to unity. 
No change is made either in the level of  subsidies to rental housing or to 
the price index of the composite commodity. Given these changes to the 
prices facing each household, the lump sum which is paid out of  the 
additional revenue generated is computed from equation (13).  Postre- 
form income of  each household is given by 
(20)  y{=yE+l. 
It remains only to define the tax rates for each household. For owner- 
occupiers and local authority tenants the tax rate on housing services is 
defined by 
tH--.  -PH-I 
PH 
(21) 
For other private tenants the discrepancy between housing costs and 
rental value is not due solely to taxes but to factors such as rent control as 
well. In these cases the tax rate is equal to rates (net of rebates) divided by 
absolute expenditure (the product ofp,  andx,).  The value of the tax rate 
on the composite  commodity was taken  to be  the ratio of  taxes on 
consumers’ expenditure (other than housing) minus subsidies to consum- 
ers’ expenditure at market prices in  1973 (tables 4.6 and 4.8, National 
Income and Expenditure 1980). This gives a tax rate of  15.6%. 
The reform is now fully defined, and statistics on the efficiency and 
distributional effects of the reform described in sections 4.2 and 4.4 may 
now be calculated. The results are discussed below in section 4.6. 
4.5.2  Alternative Assumptions 
As set out above, our definition of  the reform implicitly assumes an 
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change in the producer price of housing services which might result from 
the changes in consumption. We take the producer price of the composite 
commodity qc as numdraire. The supply of  housing services is related to 
the relative producer price of  the two commodities, and for purposes of 
simulation we shall consider the case in which there is a constant elasticity 
of supply of housing services. This is consistent with the following specifi- 
cation of  the economy’s production possibility frontier. Let this be de- 
noted by the function 
In competitive equilibrium we have that 
where FH  and Fc denote the partial derivatives of F with respect to its two 
arguments. Assume that the production possibility frontier is described 
by 
(24) 
(Y  -XHl+s+XC=O, 
l+s 
where (Y  and s are constants. Then from (23) and (24) 
4c 
(25) 
The value of  s  is the inverse of the price elasticity of supply of housing 
services. Since qc is taken as the numkraire, 
(27) 
For a finite supply elasticity the postreform  values of  the price of 
housing  services are (for owner-occupiers and  uncontrolled  tenants) 
equal to the values given above by the definition of  the reform multiplied 
by A. 
One consequence of a finite supply elasticity is that the market values 
of homes will be lower in the postreform equilibrium than in the original 122  Mervyn A. King 
position. This reduces the wealth of  homeowners and landlords. Since 
almost all rental accommodation in the United Kingdom is subject to rent 
control with security of tenure for tenants, the effect on the net worth of 
landlords is likely to be small and we shall ignore this. To convert the fall 
in house prices to an equivalent reduction  in  permanent  income we 
multiply by an appropriate real interest r. Hence equation (20) becomes 
where  D = 1  for  owner-occupiers  and  zero  otherwise,  and 
V& = prereform market value of  home. 
We assume a value for r  of  2.5% per annum, which  is clearly an 
arbitrary choice; but in the absence of  a model of  portfolio behavior an 
assumption of  this kind is necessary. No data on house prices are col- 
lected by the FES. Values of house prices were therefore imputed to each 
dwelling by using the estimated relation between house prices and rate- 
able values found by Hughes (1981) using data from building societies. 
The fitted equation is quadratic with regionally varying coefficients (over 
the ten standard regions of England and Wales). Hughes’s estimates refer 
to 1976, and these were adjusted to 1973 by  an index of  house prices 
(table V1.18, Housing Policy Review Technical Volume,  part 2). We shall 
present results for two different assumptions about the supply elasticity. 
First, we take as the base case an infinite elasticity of supply (s = 0), which 
might be defended as a not unreasonable assumption in the very long run. 
Second, we consider an elasticity of  2.0 (s =  OS),  which is in line with 
empirical estimates for the United States (Huang 1973; Poterba 1980). 
Since the postreform demand for housing depends upon both A and I, 
equations (27) and (28) are two nonlinear simultaneous equations in A 
and 1, which are solved by iterative methods. Given equilibrium values 
for A and I, postreform values of prices, incomes, and consumption may 
be computed, and the reform is completely defined. 
If  the desired lump-sum transfers are infeasible, then an additional 
dollar raised by the elimination of  subsidies will have a social value of 
more than one dollar. This reflects the gains which could be obtained by 
using the extra revenue to reduce other distortionary taxes rather than 
using it, as assumed here, to make lump-sum payments to households. In 
principle, this alternative use of the revenue should be modeled directly 
in order to gauge accurately both its efficiency and distributional con- 
sequences. But since there are many alternatives, we will illustrate the 
possible outcome by  regarding the effective lump-sum transfer  made 
possible by  the reform as equal to yl, where y is the value of  an extra 
dollar generated by the tax system. We shall consider two values of y: 1  .O 
and  1.2, respectively.  Two amendments to the equations defining a 
reform are necessary to incorporate y. These are 123  Distribution of  Gains and Losses from Housing Tax Treatment 
4.6  Results 
In this section we present the results of  simulating the introduction of a 
tax on imputed rental income. The reform was defined in section 4.5. 
Table 4.1 shows some summary statistics of the effect of  this reform for 
the base case with an infinite supply elasticity and y = 1. The price of 
housing services is unchanged for tenants but is increased  for owner- 
occupiers. The price  of  other consumption goods is unchanged,  and 
income is increased on average because the proceeds of  the new tax are 
distributed to  households as a lump-sum subsidy. The values of prices and 
incomes before and after the reform are shown in table 4.1  together with 
the values  of  pre-  and postreform  equivalent incomes,  the values  of 
housing consumption, and the values of  both cash and equivalent gain. 
All monetary values are in f per week. 
The lump-sum subsidy which can be financed is 83.3 pence per week in 
1973 prices (from [20] this is the difference between mean yo  and mean 
y”),  which corresponds to f2.42 per week at 1980 prices. The efficiency 
gains of  the reform (which equal the mean value of  equivalent gain per 
household) amount to 16.5~  per week at 1973 prices, 48.2~  per week at 
1980 prices. This is almost exactly 20% of  the value of  the lump-sum 
subsidy and is equal to 0.4 of  1% of  mean household income. 
Even the summary results in table 4.1 show that in addition to the 
positive efficiency gain from the reform, the distributional  effects are 
substantial. The maximum gain to a household is equal to the additional 
lump-sum payment, and this is exactly equal to the gain experienced by 
tenants. Some owner-occupied  households,  however,  lose  markedly. 
The maximum gain is much smaller than the maximum loss (comparing 
the figures in the “maximum” and “minimum” columns for the measures 
of gain). In the main this reflects the distribution of the tax receipts in the 
form of  a lump-sum  subsidy.  If  the revenue  had been  distributed  in 
proportion to consumption or income in the original position, then the 
disparity between maximum gains and losses would have been much less. 
Nevertheless, even with the lump-sum subsidy more people gain from the 
reform than lose  (see the columns  “number positive”  and “number 
negative”).  Looking first at the value of  cash gain, which measures the 
impact effect of the reform, we see that 54.3% of  households gain from Table 4.1  Summary Statistics of Reform, All Tenures 
Coefficient 
No.  No.  Standard  of 
Minimum  Average  Maximum  Positive  Negative  Deviation  Variation 
YO  3.415 
Pi  .150 
YP  4.248 
P5  ,150 
YE  2.948 
Y$  3.667 
P:  1.ooO 
Ppc  1.ooO 
CG  -12.551 
EG  -10,497 
XO  .353 

























5,895  0 
5,895  0 
5,895  0 
5,895  0 
5,895  0 
5,895  0 
5,895  0 
5,895  0 
3,199  2,696 
3,622  2,273 
5,895  0 
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the reform and the balance lose. These figures underestimate the propor- 
tion of  households which benefit from the reform, because they ignore 
behavioral responses. Incorporating behavioral responses into the cal- 
culation of gains, we find that the proportion of  households which gain 
from the reform (have a positive value of equivalent gain) rises to 61.4%. 
In other words, ignoring behavioral responses leads to an underestimate 
of the number of households which would gain from the reform of  11.7%. 
Table 4.2 shows the same set of  summary statistics for owner-occupiers 
only. The  mean value of equivalent gain is -  41.9~  per week, whereas for 
households in rented accommodations the figure is  + 83.4~  per week. 
The price of housing services to owner-occupiers rises by 25.8%. As with 
the full sample, the mean value of  equivalent gain is only a partial view of 
the effects of  the reform. The distribution of the values of equivalent gain 
around the mean seems at least as significant as the value of  the mean 
itself. This is illustrated by table 4.3, which shows the mean values of  both 
cash and equivalent gain for deciles of  the original income distribution. 
We also show for each decile the numbers of  households which gain and 
lose  from  the reform. The mean  value  of  equivalent  and  cash  gain 
declines as we move up through the income distribution, and from the 
sixth decile upward the number of  people who lose exceeds the number 
who gain from the reform. In the bottom three deciles all households gain 
from a reform, but in the top six deciles there are significant numbers of 
households who both gain and lose. In the fifth decile, for example, the 
mean value of  equivalent gain is positive,  but there are almost equal 
numbers of  households who gain and lose. Clearly, when assessing the 
effects of  a reform, one should not overlook the distribution of  gains and 
losses within subgroups (such as deciles of  the income distribution or 
tenure groups). 
Summary measures of  the effects of the reform on  vertical and horizon- 
tal inequality are shown in tables 4.4 and 4.5. These show inequality 
measures as defined in section 4.3 for two comparisons of  the distribu- 
tions of  (1) initial income and initial income plus cash gain, and (2) initial 
equivalent income and  postreform equivalent income. In both cases it can 
be seen that the distributional effects of  the reform are significant and 
that this particular reform reduces the measure of  vertical inequality for 
all values of the vertical inequality aversion parameter. The effects of the 
reform on horizontal inequity are such that the index of overall inequality 
is higher in the postreform distribution than in the original distribution 
for low values of the vertical inequality aversion parameter, whereas for 
egalitarian social preferences the index of overall inequality is lower in 
the postreform distribution. 
The value of  the social gain is shown in table 4.6. The entries in this 
table measure the social valuation of  the reform for different values of  the 
vertical  and horizontal inequality  aversion parameters in f per week. Table 4.2  Summary Statistics of Reform, Owner-Occupiers 
Coefficient 
No.  No.  Standard  of 
Minimum  Average  Maximum  Positive  Negative  Deviation  Variation 
5.468  51.782  472.821  3,143  0  31.047  .600 
y:  ,743  .982  1.363  3,143  0  .057  .058 
1  .OOo  1.033  1.064  3,143  0  ,022  .021 
6.301  52.615  473.654  3,143  0  31.047  ,590  YP 
P5  1.013  1.235  1.609  3,143  0  ,057  ,046 
Ppc  1  .OOo  1.033  1.064  3,143  0  .022  .021 
Yg  5.590  51.760  482.533  3,143  0  30.928  .598 
Y%  6.293  51.342  471.821  3,143  0  30.196  .588 
2 
CG  -  12.551  -  .647  .648  447  2,696  .664  -  1.027 
EG  -  10.497  -  .419  .688  870  2,273  .735  -  1.755 
XO  ,353  5.483  53.4%  3,143  0  2.637  .481 
XP  .577  4.717  42.666  3,143  0  2.766  ,586 127  Distribution of  Gains and Losses from Housing Tax Treatment 
Table 4.3  The Distribution of  Gains by Deciles 
of Original Income (E per week, 1973 prices) 
Mean  Mean  Mean  No.  No.  YO 
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0  100 
0  100 
0  100 
34  94 
284  52 
330  44 
343  42 
397  33 
416  29 
469  20 
2,273  61 
‘The  “no.  gainers” is the number of  households with a positive value for equivalent gain, 
and the “no.  losers” refers to households with negative equivalent gain. 
When both parameters are zero, social preferences are defined only over 
the efficiency benefits of  the reform, and the entry in the top left-hand 
corner of  the table measures the average efficiency gain. This differs 
slightly from mean equivalent gain because the two measures of change in 
deadweight loss are defined with respect to different price vectors, the 
mean price level in one case and the actual price level for each household 
in  the other. For zero values of  the horizontal inequity aversion para- 
meter, the social gain measures only the effect of  the reform on vertical 
inequality, and it is evident from the table that the value of the social gain 
rises quite sharply as the value of  the vertical inequality aversion para- 
meter increases. For example, for an E value of 2.0 the social gain is 63p 
per week, which is almost four times as large as the pure efficiency gain. 
If  we  consider positive values for the horizontal  inequity aversion 
parameter,  then we see that for low values of  the vertical inequality 
aversion parameter the social gain is actually negative. This is because the 
benefits in terms of a more equal distribution are offset by the social costs 
of the change in the ordering within the distribution brought about by the 
reform. This trade-off between the efficiency gains, the change in vertical 
inequality, and horizontal inequity is shown more explicitly in figure 4.1. 
In this diagram the line of  indifference shows those combinations of the 
two inequality aversion parameters for which we are indifferent between 
the original  and the postreform  position.  Any  point  in  the positive 
quadrant represents a set of social preferences, and for preferences to the 
northwest of  the indifference line the reform is preferred to the original 
distribution. For preferences to the southeast of the indifference line the 
original position is preferred to the postreform equilibrium. 128  Mervyn A. King 
Table 4.4  Inequality Index for the Distributions of yo  and  yo + CG 
Index of  Vertical Inequality 
Original 
&  Distribution 
Final 
Distribution 
.o  .Ooo 
.5  ,088 
1  .o  ,174 
2.0  ,337 






Index of  Horizontal Inequality 
&  .  500  1  .Ooo  2.000  5.000 
.o  ,008  .015  ,030  ,072 
.5  ,007  ,014  ,029  ,070 
1  .o  ,007  .014  ,027  ,061 
2.0  ,006  ,012  ,024  .058 
5.0  ,003  ,007  ,014  ,035 
Index of  Overall Inequality 
Original  Final Distribution 7 
Distri- 
E  bution  .OOO  ,500  1.000  2.000  5.000 
.o  ,000  .om  ,008  .015  ,030  ,072 
.5  ,088  .085  ,092  .098  ,111  .149 
1  .o  ,174  ,168  ,174  ,180  ,191  ,224 
2.0  ,337  ,324  ,328  .332  ,340  ,364 
5.0  ,639  ,610  ,611  .612  ,615  ,624 
The calculations presented so far assume an infinite supply elasticity of 
housing services. Although estimates of the long-run supply elasticity are 
hard to come by, it is not implausible to suppose that it is a good deal less 
than infinite (White and White 1977). We have therefore repeated the 
calculations for an assumed value of  the supply elasticity of  2.0, which 
seems in line with some of  the estimates reported for the United States 
(Poterba 1980). The supply price of  housing services is now endogenous 
to the model. Changes in the supply price reflect changes in factor prices 
(mainly in land prices), and these feed through to household incomes in 
the way described in section 4.5. 
Summary statistics of the reform assuming a supply elasticity of 2.0  are 
shown in table 4.7. After the reform the fall in the producer price of 
housing  services  is  5.7%  and  the lump-sum  payment  which  can  be 
financed  is 83.1~  per week.  The mean  equivalent  gain  rises  slightly 129  Distribution of  Gains and Losses from Housing Tax Treatment 
Table 4.5  Inequality Index for the Distributions of y$ and ys 
~~  ~ 
Index of  Vertical Inequality 
Original  Final 
E  Distribution  Distribution 
.o  ,000 
.5  .087 
1  .o  ,171 
2.0  ,330 






Index of  Horizontal Inequality 
&  .500  1  .om  2.000  5.000 
.o  ,006  ,012  .024  ,058 
.5  .006  ,011  ,023  ,055 
1  .o  .005  ,010  ,020  ,050 
2.0  .004  ,008  ,015  .038 
5.0  .001  ,002  ,005  ,012 
~~~  ~  ~~  ~ 
Index of  Overall Inequality 
Original  Final Distribution q 
Distri- 
&  bution  ,000  .500  1.000  2.000  5.000 
~~ 
.o  ,000  .Ooo  ,006  .012  ,024  ,058 
.5  ,087  ,082  ,087  ,092  ,103  ,133 
1  .o  ,171  ,161  ,166  .170  ,179  ,204 
2.0  .330  ,311  .313  ,316  ,321  ,337 
5.0  ,635  ,596  ,597  ,597  ,598  ,601 
(compared with table 4.1) to  21.9~  per week. No great significance should 
be read into this, because the fact that producer prices are endogenous 
does not in itself give rise to any additional reason for an efficiency gain. 
But since the reform entails moving from one second-best equilibrium to 
another, it is perfectly possible for the mean value of equivalent gain to 
rise when  supply responses are taken into account. The approximate 
nature of  the imputation of  house prices  (and the calculation  of  the 
implied fall in permanent income) means that there is uncertainty about 
the precise value of  the mean equivalent gain. 
Allowing for supply effects illustrates also the phenomenon noted by 
White and White (1977),  namely that removal of  the subsidy to owner 
occupation benefits renters not only because they receive a lump-sum 
payment financed out of  the additional revenue but also because they 
face lower rents. The mean equivalent gain for tenants in the uncon- 130  Mervyn A. King 
Table 4.6  Social Gain (f per week) 
E  ,000  .5OOo  1.000  2.000  5.000 
.o  .169  -  .lo2  -  ,369  -  ,899  -  2.426 
.5  ,319  .lo9  -  ,099  -  ,509  -  1.699 
1.0  ,447  ,292  .137  -  ,167  -  1.050 
2.0  ,269  ,552  ,475  ,323  -  ,124 
5.0  ,778  ,769  ,758  ,738  ,675 
trolled sector is Z1.08 per week with a supply elasticity of 2.0 compared 
with 83.313 per week for an infinite supply elasticity. 
The final calculations refer to the shadow value of increased revenues. 
With  a  value  of  y  of  1.2 (and ignoring supply responses)  the  mean 
equivalent gain is 36.6~  per week compared with 16.5~  per week for 
y = 1.0. The proportions of the sample which gain are, respectively, 68.1 
and 61.4% for the two assumptions. Clearly, the efficiency gains are 
sensitive to alternative uses of the higher revenue generated by the tax on 
imputed income. The introduction of  labor supply or other household 
decisions into the model would enable these alternative uses to be mod- 
eled exactly and will be the subject of  future work. 
Fig. 4.1  Indifference line for reform. 131  Distribution of  Gains and Losses from Housing Tax Treatment 
Table 4.7  Summary Statistics of Reform, Supply Elasticity = 2.0 
Coefficient 
No.  No.  Standard  of 
Minimum  Average  Maximum  Positive  Negative  Deviation  Variation 
YO  3.415  44.233  618.876  5,895  0  29.070  ,657 
Pi  ,150  ,982  7.572  5,895  0  ,396  ,403 
YP  4.246  44.928  619.707  5,895  0  29.002  .646 
Pi  ,150  1.075  7.138  5,895  0  .389  ,362 
yg  2.948  44.188  601.890  5,895  0  28.846  ,653 
Y;  3.699  44.409  602.698  5,895  0  28.345  ,638 
CG  -12.551  ,000  ,739  3,199  2,696  ,845 
EG  -7.869  ,219  2.027  3,648  2,247  .742  3.388 
X0  ,353  4.912  53.496  5,895  0  2.342  ,477 
XP  ,230  4.313  61.405  5,895  0  2.710  ,628 
p:  1.OOO  1.034  1.064  5,895  0  .022  ,021 
pT.  1.000  1.034  1.064  5,895  0  ,022  ,021 
4.7  Conclusions 
We have presented a methodology for computing the gains and losses 
from tax reform which provides information on both the efficiency and 
distributional effects of  reform. The figures refer to both the impact effect 
of  the reform  and the long-run  consequences once households have 
adjusted  their  behavior.  Behavioral  responses  were  incorporated  by 
using  econometric  estimates  of  the parameters of  an indirect  utility 
function. The efficiency and distributional aspects were linked by the 
concept of  “equivalent gain.” 
The aim of  this paper has been to illustrate a methodology that can be 
used  for general tax reform analysis using large data sets so that the 
calculations described here become a more routine task than is usually 
the case in policy analysis, especially in government. The question of  who 
gains and who loses from a reform is of  economic and political interest, 
and with the growing use of microdata sets the economist will be able to 
provide to policymakers information relevant to this question. 
References 
Atkinson, A. B. 1970. On the measurement  of  inequality. Journal of 
Atkinson, A. B., and M. A. King. 1980. Housing policy, taxation, and 
Economic Theory 2: 244-63. 
Reform. Midland Bank Review, spring, pp. 7-15. 132  Mervyn A. King 
Auerbach, A. J., and H. S. Rosen. 1980. Will the real excess burden 
please stand up? (Or, Seven measures in search of a concept). Working 
Paper no. 495. 
Clark, C., and G. T. Jones. 1971. The demand for housing. Centre for 
Environmental Studies Working Paper no. 11. London. 
Diamond, P. A., and D. L. McFadden. 1974. Some uses of the expendi- 
ture function in public finance. Journal of  Public Economics 3: 3-21. 
Harberger, A. C. 1974. Taxation and welfare, Boston: Little, Brown. 
Hausman, J. A. 1981. Exact consumer’s surplus and deadweight loss. 
American Economic Review 71, no. 4: 662-76. 
Huang, D. S. 1973. “Short-run instability in single family starts. Journal 
of  the American Statistical Association 68: 788-92. 
Hughes, G. A. 1980. Housing and the tax system. In G. A. Hughes and 
G. M. and Heal, eds., Public policy and the tax system. London: Allen 
& Unwin. 
. 1981. The taxation of housing: Some analytical and simulation 
results. Mimeo, Cambridge University, Cambridge, England. 
Kay, J.  A. 1980. The deadweight loss from a tax system. Journal of Public 
Economics 13: 111-19. 
Kay, J. A., and M. A. King. 1980. The British tax system. 2d ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
King, M. A. 1980. An  econometric model of  tenure choice and the 
demand for housing as a joint decision. Journal of  Public Economics 
. 1983a. An index of  inequality: With applications to horizontal 
equity and social mobility. Econometrica, vol. 51. 
. 19836. Welfare analysis of  tax reforms using household data. 
Forthcoming in Journal of  Public Economics. 
Mohring, H. 1971. Alternative gain and loss measures.  Western Eco- 
nomic Journal 9: 349-68. 
Polinsky, A. M. 1977. The demand for housing: A study in specification 
and grouping. Econometrica 45: 44741. 
Poterba, J.  M. 1980. Inflation, income, taxes, and owner-occupied hous- 
ing. NBER Working Paper no. 553. 
Rosen,  H. S. 1978. The measurement  of  excess burden  with explicit 
utility functions. Journal of Political Economy 86 (supplement): S121- 
35. 
. 1979. Housing decisions and the US income tax: An econometric 
analysis. Journal of  Public Economics 11: 1-24. 
Rosen, H. S., and K. A. Small. 1981. Applied welfare economics with 
discrete choice models. Econometrica, vol. 49. 
White, M. H., and L. J. White. 1977. The tax subsidy to owner-occupied 
housing: Who benefits? Journal of  Public Economics 7: 111-26. 
14: 137-59. 133  Distribution of  Gains and Losses from Housing Tax Treatment 
Comment  Patric H. Hendershott 
King calculates the impact of  the reintroduction in the United Kingdom 
of  a tax on the imputed rental income of  owner-occupiers. This tax was in 
place prior to 1963, and it may be a viable policy option in the United 
Kingdom, in contrast to the United States.  The calculated impacts of  this 
tax reform, computed using data for nearly 6,000 households in 1973-74, 
include (a) the total efficiency gain; (b)  the distributive effects by and 
within income deciles; (c)  the distributive effects in terms of  indexes of 
vertical and horizontal inequality; and (d)  several measures of  the social 
value of  the reform. King emphasizes the methodology underlying his 
calculations rather than the calculations per se. 
My remarks are divided into three parts. The first part is a summary of 
the calculation of  individual household gains and losses and the total 
efficiency gain of  the reform  when  the supply of  housing services is 
infinitely price elastic. This calculation is a model of  clarity and can serve 
as an excellent methodological guide for the analysis of the impact of a 
wide range of  government programs. The second part of my discussion 
relates to the analysis when the supply price of  housing services has a 
finite elasticity. I conclude with a critique of  the use of  the indexes of 
horizontal and vertical inequality in the measurement of the social value 
of  the reform. 
Gains and Losses of  Individual Households 
In a simple two-commodity  model,  housing (H)  and a nonhousing 
composite commodity (C), King’s “equivalent gain” (EG) (positive or 
negative) from the reform for a given household is the change in income 
that, at prereform prices, provides the household with the same utility 
that it would receive with the reform. That is, EG is calculated from 
King’s equation (6): 
(1)  V(YO  + EG,p;,p;)  = ~(YP,Pfi,PPc)  , 
where the subscripted variables are household-specific and are inclusive 
of good-specific net (of subsidy) taxes, y is nominal income less noncon- 
sumption net taxes, and the superscripts denote original (0) and postre- 
form (p)  values. Implementation of this procedure requires (1) specifica- 
tion of  an indirect utility function and the price and output adjustment 
mechanism of  the economy, (2) a description of  the government use of 
the additional tax revenues, and (3) an analysis of  the direct impact of  the 
tax reform on the household-specific price of  housing services. 
Patric H. Hendershott  is  a professor of  finance at The Ohio State University and a 
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King's specification takes the following form: a translog indirect utility 
function is hypothesized and employed to derive a demand function for 
housing services. Estimation of  the demand function fully specifies both 
the utility function and the demand for the composite commodity. The 
two demands, in turn, fully determine the quantities of  the two goods 
because infinite supply price elasticities are assumed. The revenue raised 
from the new tax are assumed to be returned to households in equal 
amounts as a rebate. The value of the rebate per household is computed 
and added to the original income of  the household to determine the 
postreform nominal income. 
For the aggregate economy, King assumes that money expenditures 
net of  all taxes and inclusive of  all subsidies are constant. That is, 
(2)  P$xCT  P&&T  =  7 
where the A superscript denotes average net of  tax prices, the T super- 
script refers to total economy-wide quantities, and K is a constant. The 
reform-induced change in the quantity of  the composite commodity is 
thus related to the change in housing consumed by 
(3) 
After a careful analysis of  the current subsidy to individual home- 
owners, King meticulously computes the direct impact of  the reform on 
the price  of  housing services for  each homeowner  and calculates its 
equivalent gain. The mean equivalent gains for households in different 
income deciles, as well the proportions in each that gain, are reported in 
his table 4.3. The bottom seven deciles gain on net, the rebates out- 
weighing the additional taxes, although over half the households in the 
sixth and seventh deciles lose. Possibly because no households in the 
lowest three deciles are homeowners, all of  them gain. One-fifth of  the 
total tax imposed (the subsidy removed) constitutes an efficiency gain. Of 
course, if the increased government revenue were returned to households 
in a different manner, then the distributive effect could be much diffe- 
rent. In fact, it would be a useful exercise to determine which method of 
returning the revenue-a  general income tax cut that would benefit upper 
income households, for example-would  minimize the distributive effect 
while maintaining  the overall  efficiency gain. This analysis is  clearly 
written, internally consistent, and of  wide applicability. 
The Case of  a Finite House Price Elasticity 
In an extension of this analysis, King replaces the assumption of infinite 
housing supply price  elasticity with  an  elasticity of  2.  Thus the tax- 
induced decline in the demand for housing lowers the price of  housing, 
and this cushions the rise in the price of housing services. Owners benefit 
from the latter but lose from the decline in the asset value of their houses. 135  Distribution of  Gains and Losses from Housing Tax Treatment 
With the finite supply elasticity for housing, the total efficiency gain 
increases by a third. 
The source of  the increased efficiency gain is likely the assumed con- 
stancy of  the price  of  the composite  (nonhousing)  commodity.  The 
tax-induced change in relative prices raises the demand for the composite 
commodity at the expense of housing. As a result, the supply price of the 
composite commodity would be expected to rise, just as the supply price 
of  housing  falls. The importance of  the constancy of  the composite 
commodity price can be seen most clearly by considering renters. Their 
postreform nominal income is assumed to equal their original nominal 
income plus the lump-sum rebate financed by the tax on implicit rents of 
owners. With  the price  of  housing declining, renters  gain further in 
addition to the lump-sum transfer. Their loss owing to the rise in the price 
of  other goods is ignored; the assumption of  constant nominal income 
when the aggregate price level is falling is inappropriate. 
In this analysis King accounts for a decline in the market value of 
houses on homeowners. Although he does not present results by tenure 
mode or income decile, this effect would obviously magnify the redis- 
tribution  from  higher-income  homeowners  to  lower-income renters. 
However, a full accounting of the impact of  the rise in the price of  the 
composite good might more than offset this redistribution. An increase in 
the real price of  nonhousing capital will raise wealth both directly and 
indirectly via the market value of  equities, and this gain will be sharply 
skewed toward higher-income households. 
Calculation of  the Social Gain 
In his most ambitious undertaking, King calculates some measures of 
the social value of  the reform. These measures depend on changes in 
equivalent income (yE)  and the utility or disutility that society or the 
individuals in it derive from the particular pattern of changes that evolve. 
Equivalent income is defined analogously to the sum of original income 
plus the equivalent gain (see equation [ l]),  except that the average values 
of  original prices,  rather than the household-specific prices,  are em- 
ployed. Why King shifts to average prices is not entirely clear, but I 
expect that this shift has little impact on the calculated social gain because 
the gain depends on the change in equivalent income where original 
equivalent income is the level that, evaluated at original average prices, 
gives the same utility as individual households earned prior to the reform. 
More specifically, the social gain (SG) is calculated from 
(4) 
where the h subscript denotes individual households and E, q,  and d are 
“inequality” parameters. When E = q = 0, the social gain is simply the 136  Mervyn A. King 
sum over all households of  their changes in equivalent income. This gain 
ought to be the same as the efficiency gain of  the earlier analysis.’ 
King views the efficiency gain as an inadequate measure of  the social 
gain for two reasons. First, society is averse to inequality in income. Thus 
a reform that leads to a more equal distribution of income-such  as the 
taxation of  housing-provides  a social gain beyond the efficiency gain. 
Second, households attach disutility to a drop in their ranking in the 
income distribution, even if  their own income is unchanged. Moreover, 
this disutility is apparently greater than the utility gain of households who 
rise equally in the ranking. Thus any reform will cause a social loss to the 
extent that it alters the ranking of households in the income distribution. 
I have some difficulty with King’s treatment of each of  these concepts. 
Insofar as society is averse to income inequality and there are no costs to 
removing it, income inequality will be eliminated. The  fact that inequality 
exists suggests that it plays a useful role and that its removal would entail 
costs. Generally,  it is felt that removal of  income inequality would reduce 
incentives to work, and thus equity considerations are traded off  against 
efficiency considerations. In this view, a reform that increases equality by 
definition  worsens  efficiency and, if  the equity-efficiency  trade-off  is 
initially in balance, society will lose on net. King accounts for the equity 
gain but ignores the efficiency loss. While one can throw this loss into the 
category of  “general equilibrium considerations to be dealt with later,” it 
seems rather misleading to measure one effect and not another when one 
has reason to believe that the latter more than offsets the former. 
There is substantial plausibility to the notion that a household’s utility 
depends on its relative income (the Jones or Duesenberry effect). Fur- 
ther, increases in relative income seems unlikely to increase utility as 
much as decreases lower it. My difficulty here is that the indirect utility 
function underlying  King’s analysis  does not incorporate  any relative 
income effect; i.e. the microeconomic relation in the model is inconsis- 
tent with the macroeconomic social utility calculation. 
An extremely simple way to include a relative income response would 
be to add log [+(R)]  to King’s equation (9), where R is the household’s 
rank in the income distribution and a+ldR >  0. If the household housing 
demand function could be maintained, then the equivalent gain equation 
(1  l),  which is EG = ypz -  yo,  where z depends on relative prices, would 
become 
That is, the equivalent gain (and equivalent income) calculations would 
be altered (lowered in absolute value). The 4(R) function is related to 
1. The average gain  is  16.9~  per week rather  than  16.5~  per week, the difference 
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King’s q,  with +(R) = 0 when q = 0. Unfortunately, it is different to 
envision a ranking function that would not alter the form of the estimated 
housing demand function, and it would be especially difficult to model a 
function that captures the asymmetric impact of  increases and decreases 
in household income ranking. But this is required to provide a micro- 
foundation for the social utility function. This Page Intentionally Left Blank